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In language comprehension, you is a de se pronoun, which means that its interpretation is guided 
by a simple de se rule (you = self-ascription by addressee), while the interpretation of other 
pronouns requires more complicated reasoning. This predicts that you should be easier to pro-
cess than I or he, especially for children. But not all occurrences of you can be correctly inter-
preted via self-ascription. We consider two cases where you does not indicate self-ascription: 
interpretation as an eavesdropper and direct speech. In our experiment, we compare children’s 
interpretation of the pronouns I, you and he, in both direct and indirect reported speech, and 
in both addressee and eavesdropping situations. We tested 71 five-year-olds, 63 nine-year-olds, 
and 52 adults in a referent-selection task and found a clear de se effect for children when directly 
addressed: they performed better with you than with I/he in indirect speech, but worse with you 
than with I/he in direct speech. We explain the latter finding in terms of the attraction of the de 
se interpretation strategy, which leads addressees to automatically self-ascribe you even in a 
direct speech report.
Keywords: de se; second person; pronoun interpretation; child language; direct and indirect 
reported speech
1 Introduction: I and you as de se pronouns
When we refer to ourselves we are usually aware that we are doing so. But, as philoso-
phers like to point out, this is not always the case. Consider for instance the classic exam-
ple of John Perry going around in circles following a trail of sugar down the aisle of the 
supermarket, hoping to find the messy shopper (Perry 1979). When asked what he thinks 
he is doing, he says, I’m trying to chase down this guy who is walking around with a torn sack 
of sugar. He is making a mess. In fact, Perry himself is the one with the torn sack, so when 
he is talking about catching the messy shopper, he is actually referring to himself without 
realizing it. Note that at this point Perry is using a third-person form (cf. (1a)) rather than 
a first-person pronoun (cf. (1b)) to refer to himself.
(1) a. He is making a mess.
 b. I am making a mess.
After going around the aisle a few times it suddenly dawns on Perry that he himself is the 
one with the torn sack of sugar. Only then will he be in a position to sincerely assert (1b). 
Now, semantically speaking, both the third-person assertion (1a) and the first-person 
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 version (1b) express the same (singular) proposition, viz. that John Perry is making a 
mess. However, the use of the first-person pronoun encodes a special, first-person per-
spective on the thought expressed (Lewis 1979; Perry 1979; Kaplan 1989). The special 
status of the pronoun I as unambiguously expressing first personal, or de se, thoughts is 
sometimes referred to by saying that I is a de se pronoun.
A potential source of confusion in the linguistic literature on the de se comes from the 
fact that semanticists like Schlenker (2003) and Anand (2006) typically use the term de 
se as a property of indirect attitude reports, rather than as a property of thoughts or sim-
ple, unembedded statements. The reportative notion of de se is defined in terms of the 
current notion of de se attitudes: an attitude report of the form x believes that p is a de se 
report if it ascribes a de se thought to x. This seems to lead to a different notion of a de se 
pronoun, viz. a pronominal element that forces a report to be read de se putative list of 
reportative de se pronouns includes PRO (as in John hopes PRO to win; cf. Chierchia 1989), 
West-African logophors and long-distance reflexives (cf. Pearson 2012 for overview and 
discussion).The English first-person pronoun, by contrast, is not a de se pronoun in the 
reportative sense because Perry thought that I was making a mess cannot be used to ascribe 
a de se attitude to Perry.1
Our excursus to de se reporting highlights the fact that de se is a relative notion. I is a de 
se pronoun relative to the current speaker, while PRO is a de se pronoun relative to its con-
troller, i.e., the subject (or object) of the superordinate matrix clause. What is less often 
discussed in the literature is that you is also a de se pronoun, but relative to the current 
addressee. To see this, imagine another shopper who sees pre-realization Perry chasing 
himself, stops him, and says:
(2) You are making a mess.
Correctly interpreting this remark will result in Perry forming a de se belief, i.e., realizing 
that it is he himself that is making the mess and that he has been chasing himself. In this 
paper we focus on this neglected de se pronoun you.
In sum, just as I is a de se pronoun for the speaker (i.e., it unambiguously expresses that 
the speaker has a de se attitude), you is a de se pronoun for the addressee (i.e., its correct 
interpretation triggers a de se attitude in the addressee). In the next section, we sketch 
how Wechsler (2010) turns this idea into a theory of the production and comprehension 
of pronouns. In the remainder of the paper we then put this theory to the test.
We close this section with a quick note on terminology. Following Lewis (1979) and 
Chierchia (1989), having a de se thought is typically analyzed in terms of the self-ascrip-
tion of a property, rather than as an attitude towards a classical proposition. Thus, Perry’s 
first-person utterance in (1b) above indicates that he self-ascribes the property of making 
a mess, while the other shopper’s second-person utterance in (2) triggers a self-ascrip-
tion of that same property by Perry. Other pronouns do not unambiguously express self-
ascription in this way. With the third-person utterance in (1a), for instance, Perry simply 
expresses that he believes the proposition that this other person is making a mess. Below 
we will use the terms de se attitude and self-ascription interchangeably.
 1 Arguably, even with a first-person matrix subject, such a report can have a non-de-se reading (in the Schlen-
ker/Anand sense). For instance, after realizing his mistake, Perry might report his utterance of He is making 
a mess as Well, as it turns out, I actually did say (about myself) that I was making mess, but at the time I didn’t 
realize it was me (cf. Maier 2009).
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2 The de se theory of pronouns
2.1 Production vs. comprehension
Looking at semantics from a communication-theoretic perspective, i.e., as coordinating 
the attitudes of speaker and hearer, you and I are each other’s mirror image. As Kamp 
(1990) puts it:
[…] the person who uses ‘I’ uses it to express self-attribution. But what an utter-
ance containing ‘I’ conveys to the hearer is not a self-attribution; rather, it is 
an attribution to some external individual [...]. There is an intimate connection 
between the meaning of ‘I’ and the special access that we have to ourselves, but 
this connection is restricted to the context of language production. […] With ‘you’ 
the story is much the same, only reversed. ‘You’ also bears a special relationship to 
i [=the self]. But here it is the construction [=comprehension] rule, and not the 
verbalization [=production] rule that must exploit the special relation to the self. 
(Kamp 1990: 69)
More recently, Wechsler (2010) in an influential paper revives this philosophical idea 
about the production–comprehension asymmetry with respect to de se interpretation. His 
aim is to turn this insight into a communication-theoretic semantics of personal pronouns. 
In a nutshell, Wechsler’s model works as follows. Given a communicative act between a 
speaker and a hearer, I is a de se pronoun for the speaker (i.e., its occurrence means the 
speaker self-ascribes a property); you is a de se pronoun for the addressee; and for all other 
combinations of person value and speech-act role the pronoun’s reference is determined 
indirectly, through reasoning about the other speech-act participant’s attitudes.
For example, take Mary’s utterance of I’m a genius. The meaning rule that captures the 
production of the first-person pronoun is simply that I means self-ascription of the speaker. 
There is no similar rule for the hearer to interpret Mary’s utterance of I. Hence the hearer 
will have to derive the meaning of I based on the production rule used by the speaker. We 
can informally represent the hearer’s reasoning as follows: I hear Mary produce I, so she 
must have used the production rule for I, i.e., I means speaker’s self-ascription. It follows 
that Mary herself expressed a de se attitude, so I refers to Mary. For you the situation is 
reversed. There is a direct de se rule capturing the addressee’s comprehension of you: you 
means self-ascription by the addressee. To correctly produce you, the speaker must reason 
as follows: I want to tell (or ask) Mary something about herself, i.e., I want her to self-
ascribe some property. There is no simple rule in the production grammar that allows me 
to do that, but let’s consider it from the addressee’s point of view: in her comprehension 
grammar there is a rule that directly associates self-ascription with you. Consequently, to 
achieve her self-ascription, I must use you. We refer to Wechsler’s paper for a more precise 
formalization.2
Summing up, Wechsler captures the semantics of pronouns in communication with the 
following two de se rules:
(3) a. de se production rule: to express a self-ascription, use I.
 b.  de se comprehension rule: to interpret you, self-ascribe the predicate.
Other configurations, such as the production of you and the comprehension of I are reduc-
ible to these rules plus some added perspectival reasoning, as sketched above.  Extrapolating 
 2 Roughly, Wechsler proposes a non-representational variant of the communication-theoretic DRT model 
sketched by Kamp (1990), using Crimmins and Perry’s (1989) notions instead of DRSs. Recent further devel-
opments of the original DRT model of de se communication include Kamp (2011) and Maier (2016). 
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Wechsler’s theory to the third-person, note that the semantics of third-person pronouns 
is usually defined negatively, in terms of the semantics of first- and second-person (Lyons 
1977). In both production and comprehension, he refers to the most salient (male) indi-
vidual that is not the speaker or addressee, so it too requires extra reasoning on top of the 
simple rules in (3).
In the remainder of this paper we focus on the interpretation side of communication. 
We want to test an empirical prediction from Wechsler’s de se theory, viz. that a dedicated 
self-ascription rule makes you easier to interpret than other pronouns. This contrasts with 
more traditional views on the semantics of pronouns. According to Kaplan (1989), for 
instance, I, you and (deictic) he are all indexicals, getting their referents from the context 
of utterance (⟦I⟧c=the speaker of c; ⟦you⟧c=the addressee of c; ⟦he⟧c= the most salient, 
male non-speaker/non-addressee in c). In particular, based on such a semantics we would 
not expect a de se bonus for the interpretation of you.3 In the remainder of this section, we 
discuss some already existing evidence for Wechsler’s de se theory, before introducing our 
own experimental design and hypotheses in Section 3.
2.2 Empirical support for self-ascriptive you
Wechsler discusses a number of predictions of his model. In addition to some typological 
and semantic facts about plural pronouns, he claims that it correctly predicts previously 
observed patterns of first- and second-person pronoun acquisition. The crucial link to 
acquisition is the idea that computing the non-de-se values of I and you requires reason-
ing about what interpretive rules the other speech-act participants may have applied or 
could apply and that that requires Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities. On this assumption, 
Wechsler’s system predicts that populations with underdeveloped ToM abilities, such as 
young children and children with autism, will have difficulty with non-de-se pronouns – 
i.e., with the comprehension of I and the production of you.
This prediction seems to be borne out. First, children correctly produce I before they 
are able to correctly interpret others’ use of I. And for you, we see the reverse pattern: 
comprehension of you is mastered before production (Charney 1980; Loveland 1984). 
Second, children with autism, who have impaired ToM abilities, are also known to have 
difficulties with pronouns, which suggests a link between ToM and pronoun interpre-
tation (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith 1985; Lee, Hobson, & Chiat 1994; Tager-Flusberg 
1994; Brehme 2014; Shield, Meier, & Tager-Flusberg 2015). New and more specific evi-
dence for Wechsler’s theory comes from a study by Markova & Smolík (2014). They 
found that children’s production of second-person pronouns (but not first-person pro-
nouns) is uniquely related to their use of mental state language. This supports Wechsler’s 
claim that reference to others (but not to oneself) requires sophisticated reasoning about 
other people’s minds.
Additional circumstantial evidence for the special, de se status of you in comprehension 
can be found in psycholinguistic studies. In the studies of Brunyé et al. (2009) and Sato 
and Bergen (2013), participants listened to statements such as You are slicing the tomato 
and had to verify whether a picture matches the described action. They found that with 
the second-person pronoun you, participants were quicker in verifying pictures where 
the slicing action was depicted from an internal, first-person perspective than from an 
external perspective. This suggests that people mentally simulate statements with sec-
ond-person pronouns from their own perspective. Moreover, when directly addressed 
as protagonist in a narrative, participants had a better spatial representation of the 
 3 If anything, in Kaplan’s semantics, I might be predicted to be the easiest pronoun, as it gets its referent 
directly from one of the core context parameters.
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scenes, a better memory of the actions, and they showed more emotional responses 
and a higher identification with the characters (Ditman et al. 2010; Brunyé et al. 2011; 
Andeweg et al. 2013).
3 When you is not you
Wechsler’s explanation of the comprehension data above would be that you is easy to pro-
cess because of the direct self-ascription rule. But the correct interpretation of you does 
not always involve self-ascription. Some occurrences of you arguably require a more com-
plicated reasoning on the part of the hearer, putting them in the same camp as other non-
de-se pronouns. To properly distinguish Wechsler’s de-se-based explanation from potential 
competing explanations of the ease of second-person pronoun processing, we should not 
just compare you with I and he, but also compare de-se you with non-de-se you. This is the 
aim of our experiment.
In this section we discuss two environments in which you denotes someone other than 
the addressee himself: overheard speech and direct quotation. In these contexts, simply 
applying the de se interpretation rule for you would give the wrong interpretation.4
3.1 Overheard conversations
When Sue says to Mary, You’re a genius, Mary is expected to self-ascribe being a genius. 
But John, who overhears this exchange as a third person will interpret it quite differently – 
he does not self-ascribe the property of being a genius, but instead forms the de re belief 
about Mary that she is a genius. In other words, while Mary applies the direct de se inter-
pretation rule, John has to figure out the correct referent of Sue’s you in much the same 
way as he would for a first- or a third-person pronoun (he could for instance reason as 
follows: I see that Mary is addressed with you so she can apply the de se rule to self-ascribe 
the predicate, which means the pronoun refers to her). It follows that, on Wechsler’s de se 
theory, you is not always easy to process.
In sum, while addressees can rely directly on the de se interpretation rule for you, over-
hearers need to derive the correct interpretation of all pronouns indirectly. In our experi-
ment we compared the interpretation of first-, second- and third-person pronouns by 
addressees and by overhearers.
3.2 Direct vs. indirect speech
There are two ways to report what someone said. In indirect reported speech, the reporter 
paraphrases the content of an original utterance in her own words, adjusting indexicals 
and other context-dependent elements if necessary. For example, consider the following 
situation – featuring the three animals we will be using in our child-friendly experimental 
stimuli. Dog tells Monkey, He gets the football, referring to Elephant. Monkey then goes to 
Elephant and reports:
(4) Dog said that you get the football.
From a production perspective, we see that the original utterance’s he is changed to you 
in the report complement. From an interpretation perspective this adjustment means that 
 4 A third candidate for a non-de-se you in English is the generic or impersonal usage of you as in “You only live 
once”. We return to generic you briefly in the discussion section below. Note that in our Dutch experimental 
materials we avoid this issue by using the strong pronoun jij, which can only be used as a second-person 
singular, rather than the weak form je, which has a number of different uses, including a generic, a plural 
possessive, and even a first person use (Je kreeg de bal van Huntelaar en toen schoot je op het doel ‘I got the ball 
from Huntelaar and then I shot on the goal’; Zeijlstra 2015). Interestingly, according to Zeijlstra’s analysis of 
speaker-referring je, the de se nature survives in the implicature that the addressee would have done the same.
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pronouns and other indexicals in an indirect speech complement are interpreted as usual. 
In particular, the you in (4) triggers its customary de se interpretation. The hearer will 
self-ascribe the property λx. Dog said that x the football (i.e., roughly, ‘getting the football 
according to Dog’).
In quoted direct speech the reporter reports the words more or less verbatim. Pronouns 
and indexicals are not adjusted to fit the reporting context but instead are just copied from 
the original speech act. Consider a different situation with our three animals. Say, Monkey 
tells Dog, You get the car. Dog can report this to Elephant with the direct speech report (5):
(5) Monkey said, “You get the car”.
Direct speech production is essentially reproduction, but now interpretation is more com-
plicated. To correctly interpret a direct speech report like (5), the hearer needs to perform 
a perspective shift, from the current reporting context (Dog addressing Elephant), to the 
original utterance’s context (Monkey addressing Dog). This perspective shift makes pro-
noun interpretation in direct speech more demanding than in indirect speech for both 
adults and children, as evident from a higher error rate and longer reaction times (Köder, 
Maier & Hendriks 2015; Köder & Maier 2016). Crucially, the directly quoted you in (5) 
cannot be interpreted directly via self-ascription by the addressee, Elephant, as that would 
lead to Elephant incorrectly self-ascribing getting the car. Rather, the listener has to rea-
son as follows: quotation induces a perspective shift, so the frame of reference needs to 
be shifted to the reported speech context, i.e., Monkey addressing Dog with the quoted 
utterance. That utterance contains a second-person pronoun and is addressed to Dog, so, 
by the de se rule, it means that Dog should self-ascribe getting the car, i.e., the correctly 
shifted referent of you is Dog.
The perspective shift of direct speech reports thus blocks the application of the simple 
de se rule for you and instead introduces more complicated indirect reasoning for inter-
preting you, as for I and he. In our experiment we will compare the interpretation of 
pronouns in direct and indirect speech reports, predicting that the ease of a de se interpre-
tation only affects the interpretation of you in indirect reports.
Since we will be looking at children’s interpretation, it is important to make sure that 
the direct–indirect distinction is clearly marked in our experimental stimuli. In spoken 
English, without recourse to written quotation marks, an utterance of Elephant said you get 
the car is ambiguous between a direct and an indirect reading. To disambiguate, we imbued 
our stimuli with the known, presumably universal, prosodic cues for direct speech: (i) a 
pause between the reporting clause and the quote (Jansen, Gregory & Brenier 2001); and 
(ii) a clear change of voice, mimicking the original speaker’s characteristic voice in the 
report clause (Wade & Clark 1993; Klewitz & Couper-Kuhlen 1999). In addition, we chose 
for our experiment a language with a very clear syntactic marking of the direct–indirect 
distinction: Dutch. In Dutch, the minimal pairs used as stimuli are of the following form:
(6) a. Aap zei, “Jij krijgt de auto”.
monkey say.pst you get.pres the car
‘Monkey said, “You get the car”.’
b. Aap zei dat jij de auto krijgt.
monkey say.pst that you the car get.pres
‘Monkey said that you get the car.’
What we see here is that indirect speech in Dutch is marked syntactically with the obliga-
torily overt complementizer dat ‘that’, and the, likewise obligatory, adjustment from verb-
second to verb-final word-order.
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3.3 Hypotheses
Concretely, our research question is as follows: What is the effect of the two manipula-
tions described in 3.1 and 3.2 on children’s (as compared to adults’) interpretation of you 
(as compared to I and he)? Based on a traditional, straightforward analysis of pronouns 
as simply picking out the speech act participant corresponding to the phi-features, we do 
not expect that these manipulations affect you differently than they affect I and he. Based 
on Wechsler’s de se theory of pronouns, we do expect an effect specifically for you, viz. 
that self-ascriptive you is easier to process than non-self-ascriptive you (e.g., quoted or 
overheard you). To test these predictions, we created a referent selection task where par-
ticipants either overheard or participated in a communicative situation involving direct 
and indirect speech stimuli with the pronouns I, you, and he/she (e.g. Monkey said that you 
get the ball, or Dog said, “I get the car”). The participants’ task was to determine the correct 
referent of the pronoun.
We derive the following three concrete hypotheses from the de se theory: (i) when 
directly addressed, without quotation, children will perform better with you than with 
other pronouns, because they can use the simple de se interpretation rule, rather than 
going through the more complicated reasoning involved in finding the referents of 
other pronouns; (ii) when children overhear a report, this de se bonus for the second-
person pronoun should disappear, since in overhearing speech the de se rule does not 
apply (or rather, does not suffice to determine the referent); and (iii) when interpreting 




The participants were 134 children between the ages of 4;5 and 10;5 and 52 adults 
(see Table 1), all native speakers of Dutch. We divided the children into younger and 
older children and will for convenience refer to these groups as the “five-year-olds” and 
the “nine-year-olds”, based on the mean age. Children were recruited from elementary 
schools in the North of the Netherlands and received a small reward (a sticker for five-year-
olds, a pen for nine-year-olds) for participating. Written parental consent was obtained 
prior to the experiment. The participants in the adult control group were mainly students 
from the University of Groningen.
Each participant took part in one experimental condition where she was either the 
addressee (addressee condition) or she overheard speech reports (overhearing condition). 
Note that the data of the overhearing condition is discussed as part of a larger popula-
tion in Köder and Maier (2016). In the following, we will explain in detail how these two 
modes of participation differ.
Age group Participation mode Number Mean age Range Gender (f/m)
5-year-olds Addressee 34 5;3 4;5–6;0 16/18
Overhearing 37 5;3 4;5–6;0 20/17
9-year-olds Addressee 38 9;0 8;4–10;2 20/18
Overhearing 25 9;7 8;3–10;5 10/15
adults Addressee 19 23 19–38 15/4
Overhearing 33 22 18–32 21/12
Table 1: Participants.
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4.2 Stimuli and procedure
Addressee condition. In the addressee condition, participants interacted with two gender-
matched hand puppets. Female participants interacted with the female puppets Mimi and 
Lola, male participants with the male puppets Bobo and Rudi. The experiment is set up as 
a game in which the participant needs to determine who gets a certain toy object (e.g., a 
cow or a table, see Figure 1a). The rules of the game are that puppet Lola decides who gets 
which object. However, Lola and the participant are not allowed to communicate directly 
with each other. This is why Lola whispers – unintelligibly for the participant – into 
Mimi’s ear who gets a certain object. Subsequently, Mimi picks up the object and trans-
mits the message to the participant using either a direct (7) or indirect (8) speech report.
(7) Lola zei, “Ik krijg de koe”.
 ‘Lola said, “I get the cow”.’
(8) Lola zei dat jij de tafel krijgt.
 ‘Lola said that you get the table.’
The participant has to put the object into the correct box: either her own box (marked with 
a yellow star) or that of Mimi or Lola (see Figure 1b). In order to identify who gets a par-
ticular object, participants need to interpret pronouns in direct and indirect speech reports.
Overhearing condition. In the overhearing condition, participants observed the inter-
action of three animals on a tablet. In short animated scenes, Elephant, for instance, 
whispers in Monkey’s ear who gets a certain object (Figure 2a) and Monkey subsequently 
reports it to Dog with a direct or indirect speech report (Figure 2b). The participants 
could select the recipient of the object, i.e., the referent of the pronoun, by touching 
one of the highlighted animals (Figure 2c). Note that in this tablet setting, as opposed 
to the puppet interaction, participants themselves are not available as referents for the 
pronouns. The stimuli in the overhearing condition are described in more detail in Köder 
and Maier (2016).
Stimuli. In both conditions, participants listened to 30 speech reports: 15 direct and 15 
indirect reports, presented in random order. The Dutch direct and indirect speech stimuli 
are clearly distinct in syntactic (verb-second vs. verb-final word order), lexical (absence 
vs. presence of complementizer) and prosodic respects (in direct speech: pause before 
quotation and change of voice in quotation). Each speech report contains either the singu-
lar pronoun ik ‘I’, jij ‘you’ or hij/zij ‘he/she’. In the addressee condition, the test sentences 
Figure 1: Test materials used in the addressee (a) Objects; (b) Boxes (female  participants).
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contained the feminine pronoun zij ‘she’ for female participants and the masculine pro-
noun hij ‘he’ for male participants to ensure that the on the third-person pronoun does not 
serve as an additional cue for reference resolution. In the overhearing condition, all three 
animals were male and therefore only the masculine form of the third-person singular 
pronoun was used, regardless of the gender of the participant.
Crucially, the second-person pronoun you only refers to the participants themselves 
when they are addressees and you is embedded in an indirect speech report. Hence, only 
in addressed indirect speech do we expect the positive effect of the de se rule on the inter-
pretation of you.
5 Results
To find out what factors explain participants’ accuracy of pronoun interpretation in speech 
reports, we created separate generalized linear mixed models for each age group. With 
a procedure of model comparison, we added stepwise the fixed-effect factors report 
type (direct, indirect), pronoun type (first-person, second-person, third-person) and 
participation mode (addressee, overhearing) as well as the interactions between these 
factors to the baseline models (including random intercepts and slopes per report type 
for subjects). A fixed-effect factor or an interaction was included in the model if it led 
to a decrease of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) of more than 2. Table 2 shows 
that the models for both the five- and nine-year-old children contain a three-way inter-
action between report type, pronoun type and participation mode. In contrast to 
children, adults’ accuracy model does not contain the factor participation mode. This 
Figure 2: Example of a test item in the overhearing (a) Incomprehensible whispering (reported 
speech context); (b) Uttering of a speech report (e.g., Elephant said that I get the football) 
(reporting speech context); (c) Selection phase.
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means that adults’ performance did not differ significantly in the addressee and overhear-
ing condition.
In order to learn more about the three-way interaction in five- and nine-year-old chil-
dren’s accuracy models, we compared the means of all combinations of report type, 
pronoun type and participation mode in these two age groups, using multiple com-
parisons from the “multcomp” package (Hothorn, Bretz, & Westfall 2008). The significant 
differences relevant for testing our predictions are marked in Figures 3 and 4.
Figure 3 shows five-year-olds’ accuracy of pronoun interpretation in the addressee con-
dition (left) and the overhearing condition (right). The multiple comparisons analysis 
reveals two main differences between children who assumed the communicative role of an 
addressee and children who overheard speech reports. First, consider the five-year-olds, 
contrasting their comprehension of direct and indirect speech. In direct speech reports, 
addressees outperformed overhearers in correctly interpreting pronouns I (p < .001) and 
he/she (p < .001), but not you. But in indirect speech reports, we found the opposite: 
overhearers outperformed addressees in interpreting I (p < .01) and he/she (p < .1), but 
5-year-olds 9-year-olds Adults
Random-effect factors (random intercepts and 
slopes per report type for subjects)
+ report type 86.1 53.5 13.5
+ pronoun type 13.5 151.9 41.5
+ report type * pronoun type 153.5 83.5 6.5
+ participation mode 1.1 6.0 –1.2
+ report type * pronoun type 
   * participation mode
51.8 22.3 –0.5
Table 2: Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) decrease for the inclusion of fixed-effect factors and 
interactions to the models explaining accuracy of pronoun interpretation in different age 
groups. An AIC decrease of more than 2 indicates that the goodness of fit of the model improves 
significantly (Akaike 1974).
Figure 3: Percentage of correct pronoun interpretation of five-year-olds in addressee condition 
(left) and overhearing condition (right); relevant significant differences marked at different 
significance levels: * p < .05, p < .01, *** p < .001. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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not you. Second, the type of pronoun (first-, second-, third-person) in direct and indirect 
speech has only an effect on children in the addressee condition, but not in the overhear-
ing condition. In the addressee condition, there were two notable effects of second person: 
(i) in direct speech reports, children performed significantly worse with you than with I 
(p < .001) and he/she (p < .001); while (ii) in indirect speech reports they performed 
significantly better with you than with I (p < .001) and he/she (p < .001).
Let’s now turn to the data of the nine-year-olds, which is presented in Figure 4. Similar 
to five-year-old children, addressees outperformed overhearers in the interpretation of 
direct speech reports with first-person (p < .001) and third-person (p < .1) pronouns, 
but not second-person pronouns. However, unlike the five-year-olds, nine-year-olds’ indi-
rect speech performance did not differ significantly between addressees and overhearers. 
Focusing on pronoun type, we find again effects of second person for children in the 
addressee condition: (i) in direct speech reports, children had the lowest accuracy for you, 
significantly lower than that of I (p < .001) and he/she (p < .001); while (ii) in indirect 
speech reports, they performed significantly better with you than with he/she (p < .001). 
Note that children in the overhearing condition were also significantly better in interpret-
ing I than you in direct speech reports (p < .001).
6 Discussion
Before we get into the de se effect, first some general observations about the effects of 
report type and participation mode, respectively.
As for report type, we find that quoted direct speech reports are harder to interpret than 
indirect speech reports. As discussed elsewhere, this is due to the processing effort associ-
ated with perspective shifting (Köder et al. 2015).
As for participation mode, we see that those children who were directly addressed were 
significantly better in direct speech interpretation than those who only overheard speech. 
We suggest that this result could be due to two, not mutually exclusive, factors. First, as 
previous studies show, interpreting deictic expressions is easier for children when they 
are addressees rather than overhearers (Charney 1980; Murphy 1986). This advantage of 
the addressee’s perspective might also be in play when deictic pronouns are embedded 
in direct speech reports. Second, the better direct speech performance in the addressee 
Figure 4: Percentage of correct pronoun interpretation of nine-year-olds in addressee  condition 
(left) and overhearing condition (right); relevant significant differences marked at different 
significance levels: * p < .05, p < .01, *** p < .001. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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condition could also be due to the more naturalistic scenario, involving real objects and 
puppets instead of animations presented on a tablet. In particular, the bodily presence 
of the reported speaker could serve as a physical anchor in the situation and make the 
reported speaker a more salient deictic orientation point. This might make it easier for the 
listener to shift to the reported speaker’s perspective, which is required for the interpreta-
tion of direct speech reports.
Interestingly, being an addressee had negative consequences for five-year-old children’s 
indirect speech performance. To explain this finding, it is important to know that in the 
overhearing condition (reported in more detail in Köder and Maier 2016) children exhibit 
a strong bias to evaluate pronouns with respect to the actual reporting context, even if 
pronouns are embedded in a direct speech report. The finding that children’s accuracy 
of direct speech interpretation improves when children are addressees suggests that they 
consider the reported speaker’s context as possible context of evaluation. However, a 
potential side effect of the increased salience of the reported context is that it creates a 
competing context of evaluation when interpreting indirect speech reports. In younger 
children, with a presumably less rigid direct–indirect distinction in the grammar (Goodell 
& Sachs 1992; Hickmann 1993), this could lead to a drop in the accuracy for pronoun 
interpretation in indirect speech reports.
Against this background, let us now revisit the three hypotheses about the interpretation 
of you from Section 3.3.
Our first hypothesis was that there should be a de se effect for (unquoted) you when 
children are directly addressed. This is confirmed. In the data from the puppet game, we 
see a clear effect of the second person. You is the pronoun with the highest accuracy in 
indirect speech, as predicted. Five-year-old children made fewer mistakes for you than for 
I and he/she, nine-year-olds fewer for you than for he/she.
The second hypothesis was that this de se effect should disappear in the overhearing 
condition. This is also confirmed. We found no effect of second-person being easier (or 
harder) than first-person or third-person pronouns in the overhearing condition.5 This 
is as expected because children playing the tablet game are effectively eavesdropping 
on the communicative acts of the animals and hence could not rely solely on the de se 
interpretation rule to interpret you. Note however that a stronger prediction, that you in 
indirect speech reports should be easier for addressees than for overhearers, could not be 
confirmed. Looking at you in indirect speech, we did not detect a significant difference 
between the overhearing and the addressee condition. This is probably due to the fact that 
in the tablet task even the younger children are already at ceiling in pronoun interpreta-
tion in indirect speech reports.
Our third and final hypothesis was that the de se effect should likewise disappear in 
quoted direct speech. This prediction is not confirmed. In the puppet game there is a 
significant effect of second person in direct speech reports, but in the opposite direction: 
The interpretation of you appears to be harder than that of I or he/she in direct speech 
reports.
We did not anticipate this anti-de-se pattern for direct speech reports in advance, but it 
can be fully explained within the de se theory, viz., as an incorrect application of the de se 
rule. The idea is that in their role as addressees, children who hear you immediately apply 
the simple and hence attractive de se rule, before taking into account the more difficult 
 5 Note that nine-year-olds made significantly fewer mistakes with I than with you in direct speech reports. 
This can be explained by the fact that the referent of I in our direct speech stimuli (e.g., Elephant said, “I get 
the football”) is explicitly mentioned in the reporting clause, which makes it more salient and accessible for 
reference (cf. Köder et al. 2015).
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perspective shifting induced by the linguistic direct speech embedding.6 In processing you 
in quoted direct speech, addressees thus start off with an incorrect de se interpretation, to 
which they should then apply a perspective shift to arrive at the correct interpretation. 
Now, unlike adults, children have difficulties with this second step. This is in line with 
previous research showing that children find it hard to revise their initial interpretation 
(Trueswell et al. 1999; Epley, Morewedge & Keysar 2004), and with our earlier observa-
tions about the heavy processing costs associated with perspective shifting in general and 
perspective shifting in direct speech in particular (Köder & Maier 2016). The fact that 
even nine-year-old children mostly fail to overrule the attraction of the de se rule for you 
suggests that de se interpretation is indeed a highly automatic mechanism.
In our study, we have investigated children’s and adults’ comprehension of pronouns 
in assertions. We speculate that the de se bias might be even stronger in the comprehen-
sion of speech acts such as imperatives or questions that are inherently more addressee-
oriented. In production, however, the pragmatic addressee bias of these speech acts might 
lead to a preference for you over de se I. Support for this speculation comes from a study 
by Tanz (1980) that found that in the production of questions, children tend to overuse 
you. For instance, when told “ask John what color your eyes are”, they asked John “What 
color are your eyes?” instead of “What color are my eyes?”. Further research is necessary 
to investigate how speech act type (e.g., assertion, question, request) interacts with the 
comprehension and production of pronouns. Results from these types of studies could 
make an important contribution to the validation and refinement of the de se theory of 
pronouns.
7 Conclusion
In a communication-theoretic framework like that of Kamp (1990; 2011) or Wechsler 
(2010), you and I are said to be each other’s mirror image: just as I is a de se pronoun 
for the speaker, you is a de se pronoun for the hearer. Hence, the interpretation of you is 
guided by a simple de se rule, while the other pronouns require more complicated reason-
ing. Such a theory makes interesting predictions about language processing. For instance, 
you should be easier to interpret than non-de-se pronouns, especially by children.
Previous research confirms that you has a special status in comprehension, but what is 
generally ignored is that not all occurrences of the second-person pronoun can be inter-
preted with the self-ascription rule. When you is embedded in a quotation, or when the 
interpreter is not directly addressed, the de se rule does not apply – or at least, it does not 
suffice to determine the referent – and the de se effect for second person should disappear.
Our experiment first of all confirms that the de se interpretation rule does indeed make 
interpretation of you by addressees easier. We found that, when directly addressed with 
an indirect speech report, children made fewer mistakes with you than with I or he. No 
such effect was found for children overhearing the stimuli as external observers playing a 
tablet game. So, children from age five can detect when they are directly addressed and 
will, correctly, only apply the de se rule in that case.
Turning now to quoted direct speech we found first of all that children have difficulties 
performing the required perspective shift, independently of any de se effect. Second, we 
found again an effect of the second person for addressees, but in the opposite direction: 
directly addressed children made more mistakes with quoted you than with quoted I and he. 
 6 This two-stage processing model for quoted you resembles de Hoop and Tarenskeen’s (2015) suggestion 
about the processing of generic you: The addressee first interprets you as usual, via self-ascription, and only 
then does she take into account the linguistic context, which in their examples triggers a shift to a generic 
interpretation.
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To explain this we suggest that the simple de se interpretation strategy is so attractive that 
addressees will automatically apply it when confronted with you, regardless of its linguis-
tic embedding context. Adults have the cognitive resources to subsequently apply the per-
spective shift signaled by the direct speech marking to arrive at the correct interpretation, 
but children have difficultly overruling their initial incorrect de se interpretation.
In sum, our study is the first to empirically demonstrate that for addressees the process-
ing of second-person singular you is special because it is based on a simple self-ascription 
rule. As predicted by the de se theory of pronoun interpretation, we found that addressees, 
but not overhearers, have an interpretation bonus for you compared to I and he/she. But 
this de se bonus disappears and in fact becomes a liability when addresses have to inter-
pret you in quoted direct speech. All of our findings are fully explained by Wechsler’s de se 
theory, but not by the traditional semantic analysis of pronouns as indexicals getting their 
referents directly from the context of utterance. Our paper thus provides strong empirical 
support for the de se theory of pronouns.
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